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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the persistency of one of today’s major subsidy schemes in Norwegian 
fisheries: exemption from fuel taxes in the fishing fleet. The reimbursement scheme stems from 
the late 1980s, and has been persistent since, under different governments. Here we provide the 
background  for  this  support  and  discuss  it’s  persistency  against  theoretical  predictions  on 
subsidies' effect on fishing behaviour. Also, we compare the Norwegian scheme against similar 
arrangements in neighbouring countries, in a comparable fashion. The Norwegian fishing fleet is 
heterogeneous with respect to oil consumption in transport and fishing operations. Hence, the 
effect of the fuel subsidies is different along different fleet components. The analysis compares 
the impact of an annulment of this scheme on two fleet groups, based on a sensitivity analysis. 
Finally we discuss the implications of abolishing this subsidy for the fishing fleet in general, 
different vessel groups and potential policy implications in the wake of such environmentally 
friendly action. 
INTRODUCTION 
Subsidies to the world’s fishing industry have been under scholars’ scrutiny for decades. The 
reason is obvious: With more effort being directed towards capture activities the evidence and 
understanding that fish resources are limited and even threatened with extinction have become 
widespread.  In  many  cases,  subsidies  have  added  to  overcapacity  and  overfishing.  The 
magnitude of subsidies within fisheries has been mapped and analysed on global (Milazzo, 1998; 
Sumaila et al., 2010) regional (Wallis & Flaaten, 2000) as well as on national level (Isaksen & 
Flaaten, 1998; Isaksen, 2000; Hermansen & Flaaten, 2004; Hermansen, 2009). Also, the effects 
of fisheries subsidies on fishing pressure, fish resources and trade have been under scrutiny 
(Porter, 1998; Sumaila et al., 2008), while others focused on the definition of fishery subsidies 
and categorization of subsidy types (Wallis & Flaaten, 2000; Porter, 2002; Shrank, 2003). 
Open  access  common  pool  fisheries  will  usually  lead  to  economic  overcapacity  and  even 
biological  over-exploitation  of  fish  resources.  Revenue  enhancing  and  cost  reducing  support 
contribute even further to this waste (Brochmann, 1981
i; Hannesson, 1991; Porter, 2003). When 
dividing different fisheries subsidies  into categories, the classification can take many forms. 
While Sumaila et al. (2010) utilize, “good”, “bad” and “ugly” subsidies – depending on their 
potential effect  on the sustainability of the fishery  resource,  Porter (2003:31-33) synthesizes 
fisheries subsidies into the following categories: 
1.  Fisheries management services 
2.  Subsidies  to  capital  costs,  including 
infrastructure 
3.  Decommissioning and licence retirement  
4.  Subsidies to incomes 
5.  Subsidies for access to foreign fisheries IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
  2 
Within these categories, fuel subsidies or other subsidies that makes intermediate inputs cheaper 
have no place. Sumaila et al. (2010) estimated world-wide fisheries subsidies in 2003 to be in the 
range  of  US$  25–29  billion,  where  fuel  subsidies  compose  about  15–30  per  cent;  whereas 
capacity enhancing subsidies compose the lion’s share, about 60 per cent. Fuel subsidies and tax 
preferences make fishing operations cheaper and encourage vessel owners to invest in stronger, 
more fuel intensive engines – which allow a greater range of operation and larger catches (Porter 
2002). 
Norway has a long history of providing assistance to the fishing industry. As put forward by 
Milazzo (1998: 23): “Norway has provided financial assistance to its fishing industry for more 
than 30 years. Since 1964, the government has negotiated annually an assistance package with 
the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, with the overall objective of raising average fisher-
men’s incomes to level  of industrial workers. Not surprisingly, though, these agreements on 
financial  assistance  soon  lost  sight  of  their  original,  short-term  objectives,  and  effectively 
became ongoing subsidies that industry came to expect each year as a matter of course.” Total 
transfers to the Norwegian fishing industry added up to a considerable share of catch value, 
peaking in 1981 with more than 30 per cent. However, from 1990, fisheries subsidies were to a 
large degree phased out, and fell from a 20 per cent share of catch value to less than five per cent 
within a four year period (Flaaten & Isaksen, 1998). Hannesson (1996: 22-3) shows anecdotally 
how the subsidization of the fishing industry in Norway was highly correlated with the price of 
crude oil in the period from 1974 to 1994. 
In 2004 the Government stopped the annual negotiations with the Fishermen’s Association on 
financial support. Since then, support to the fishing industry has been modest. Figure 1 (a) shows 
the peak in fisheries subsidies, as defined by the authorities, in the early 1980s and the rapid 
decline since then. From Figure 1 (b) we see that the fall in subsidies coincides with a rapid 
increase in catch per fisherman, as both number of fishermen and fishing vessels are drastically 
reduced. Figure 1 (a), however, do not include the subsidy element we are interested in – the fuel 
tax  reimbursement  scheme,  since  Norwegian  authorities  take  a  more  cautious  definition  of 
subsidies than the WTO “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” agreement. 
a)   b)  
Figure 1.  a) Subsidies to the Norwegian fishing industry, 1960–2010 (bill NOK, nominal value) 
b) catch (right axis), fishermen and catch per fisherman (left axis – all in tons) 1945–
2010. Source: Directorate of Fisheries IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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In the WTO framework (WTO, 2009), financial contributions not only include direct transfer of 
funds, but also revenue forgone by the authorities, provision of goods or services and purchase of 
goods. According to the WTO, subsidies are further divided in two categories; prohibited and 
actionable.  Export  subsidies  and  subsidies  favouring  local  content  are  prohibited.  Using  the 
WTO-definition of subsidies, the Norwegian fishing industry is directly supported by mNOK 72, 
while general  services  and tax exemptions  add up to  bNOK 2.21 in 2008. The main  direct 
support items are transportation support (49 per cent) and support to the seal harvest (16 per 
cent).  Of  the  indirect  support  items,  the  coast  guard  (22  per  cent),  income  and  CO2-tax 
exemption (both 16 per cent) and research support (14 per cent) takes the lion’s share. In the next 
section we’ll take a closer look at the fuel tax exemption scheme. 
We focus on the Norwegian fuel subsidies – the exemption of fuel taxes for fishing vessels – a 
scheme which has been in effect since 1988. Our research problem is four-folded: First, we 
describe the Norwegian mineral oil tax reimbursement scheme and its history and place it within 
the classification scheme of fisheries subsidies. Second, we portray this specific industry support 
with respect to the industry development. Third, we analyse the effect of a possible annulment of 
this support, and, finally, we discuss and conclude our findings with respect to industry impact 
and policy implication. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the background for our analysis. 
Then we account for the mineral oil taxation scheme and data, before discussing the method and 
results. Finally, we discuss our findings and their implication for the industry and policy makers. 
 
NORWEGIAN FUEL TAX EXEMPTIONS AND DATA 
From 1970, Norwegian enterprises and consumers were taxed for their use of fuel oil, primarily 
to reduce environmentally harmful emissions. However, from the start registered fishing vessels 
were  exempted  from  the  most  important  fuel  taxes.  This  is  the  case  also  for  some  other 
industries. The taxation scheme has been modified and presently purchase of fuel is levied with 
CO2,  SO2  and  NOx  taxes.  In  2008,  the  CO2  tax  rate  was  1.395  NOK/litre.  The  SO2  tax  is 
progressive and charges 0.072 NOK/l for each commenced 0.25 per cent sulphur in the fuel 
(weight  basis).  NOX  is  taxed  based  on  calculated  emissions;  the  rate  in  2008  being  15.39 
NOK/kg NOX.  
To some degree fisheries are exempted from these taxes. In terms of the CO2 tax, all fisheries are 
exempted, while only distant water fisheries (further than 250 nautical miles from the coast) are 
exempted from the SO2 tax
ii. In practice, vessels buy taxed fuel and are reimbursed the CO2 tax 
from a government agency. When heading for distant water fisheries, vessels purchase untaxed 
fuel directly. The most complicated regime is found for the NOX tax. Fishing vessels with less 
than 750 kW engine power are totally exempted. An agreement on reduction of emissions was 
signed by the authorities and several industry organizations. Instead of paying the full tax rate, 
vessels (both fishing vessels and others) that entered into this agreement pay a reduced rate of 
4.0 NOK/kg NOX. Tax revenues go to a fund that financially supports investments in emission 
reducing measures aboard vessels.  IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Detailed data  for individual  vessels  were obtained  from The Guarantee Fund for  Fishermen 
(GfF), which has administered the reimbursement scheme since its introduction. In a special data 
set, we had information for every vessel that were granted fuel tax reimbursement in the period 
2000–2007, from which aggregated annual figures over reimbursed volume and value could be 
estimated. In addition, we were granted access to the data behind the annual profitability study 
for the fishing fleet from the Directorate of Fisheries (Anon. 2008). From there, cost- and income 
data, together with catch and operational data, could be obtained for individual vessels, as well as 
average values for vessel groups. This source, however, represents only a sample of vessels and 
not the whole population where the selection criterion is mainly the importance of the vessel 
with respect to first hand sales value. From a total of 1 709 whole year operated vessels, data for 
624 vessels were collected and compared (37 per cent). For some vessel groups, with rather low 
catch value, the sample size’s share of the population is rather small (for example for coastal 
vessels less than 10 meters it was only 16 per cent), while for larger vessels it is usually in the 
range of 60–95 per cent. The main reason for the differences in relative sample size is that the 
number of vessels in the sub-population is significantly higher for the former than the latter. 
 
RESULTS 
In estimating the value of the total mineral oil tax exemption for the fishing fleet in 2007, shown 
in Table 1, we have employed a static model, thus not taking into account substitution effects and 
other adaptations the fishing fleet could have introduced as responses to higher taxes. Official 
Norwegian  statistics  on  fuel  use  across  industries  are  not  reliable  since  2005  (Isaksen  and 
Hermansen, 2009). This study is based on average fuel costs and average fuel prices, and by 
utilizing the annual profitability survey of Norwegian fishing vessels (Directorate of Fisheries, 
2008), the estimate of the actual fuel consumption of the Norwegian fishing fleet in 2007 is 362 
million  litres.  Of  this,  244  million  litres  (2/3)  fall  in  under,  and  is  accounted  for,  in  the 
reimbursement  scheme,  while  the  rest,  118  mill  litres,  is  the  estimated  consumption  of 
Norwegian vessels operating in distant waters – from “tax free” bunkering in Norway, at sea in 
international waters or abroad (Isaksen and Hermansen, 2009).  
An estimate of the foregone CO2 tax is obtained by multiplying consumption with tax rate. In 
2007, GfF reimbursed fish vessel owners a total of mNOK 236 of CO2-tax. The rest stems from 
fuel  consumption  exempted  from  CO2  taxation.  To  estimate  foregone  SO2  tax  is  more 
complicated,  as  the  coastal  fisheries  pay  this  tax,  but  data  on  consumption  in  distant  water 
fisheries’ are not available. Therefore the latter is estimated from data on reimbursed amount, 
assuming all other use is in distant waters. We also assume that all fuel contains less than 0.25 % 
sulphur, since heavy fuels rarely are used in the fishing fleet. The exempted NOX tax in 2007 is 
estimated to mNOK 327 using a rate of 0.9 NOK per litre fuel.  
Table 1.  Estimated exempted mineral oil taxes in the Norwegian fishing fleet, 2007.  
Tax  CO2  SO2  NOX  Total 
Value (mNOK)  352  8  327  687 IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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From an economic (and environmental) point of view, the optimal emission tax on CO2 should 
be equal across countries and sectors since the marginal damage is independent of the location of 
the emission source (Bye & Bruvoll 2008). From the “polluter pay” principle either taxes or 
emission rights should be utilised. However, CO2 taxes vary between countries, as well as within 
national economic sectors and across fuel types (op. cit). The same applies to SO2, NOx and other 
environmental taxes. 
When considering the subsidy element of the CO2-tax reimbursement/exemption the contribution 
should be determined on market prices (see a recent WTO ruling; WTO, 2009??). In the EU 
quota market for CO2 emissions, the price per ton varied between 124 and 235 NOK (€ 13.55–
29.40) in 2008 (Isaksen and Hermansen, 2009). The tax in Norway in 2008 (NOK 1,395 per litre 
oil)  corresponds  to  a  rate  of  528  NOK  per  ton  CO2  emissions,  which  indicates  a  tax 
approximately two to four times as high as the market price of CO2.  
The exemption from the CO2 tax for the fishing fleet operating in coastal waters was introduced 
in 1988, due to the difficult economic situation in the industry. At that time the tax amounted to 
0.21 NOK/litre oil, and it has increased to 1.599 NOK/litre today (2012). In Figure 2, the average 
operating margin in the Norwegian fishing fleet is portrayed. It should, however, be noted that 
the average operating margin hides huge variations between different vessel groups. In 2010 it 
varied from -1.5 per cent (pelagic coastal vessels under 11 metres) to 27.8 per cent (large purse 
seiners).  As  will  be  discussed  below  the  rationale  for  supporting  the  fishing  industry  has 
dwindled since the late 1980s. 
 
Figure 2.  Average operating margin (EBIT’s share of turnover) in the Norwegian fishing fleet, 
1980–2010. Source: Directorate of Fisheries 
At hand for evaluating subsidies within fisheries is the well-developed bioeconomic analysis. 
Theory, together with empirical evidence, demonstrates that fish resources, left un-regulated with 
free access usually will lead to over-exploitation and dissipation of resource rent (Hannesson, 
1991; Flaaten, 2011). Simple bioeconomic models usually do not portray the heterogeneity of 
vessels  and  fisheries,  but  nevertheless  give  an  informative  and  clear  view  of  how  subsidies 
distort the industry. Revenue enhancing and cost reducing support contribute even further to the 
free access waste, by augmenting effort and reducing fish stocks (Brochmann, 1981; Hannesson, 
1991; Porter, 2003). However, the biological effects from subsidies are different when property 
rights  and  good  management  systems  are  in  place,  which  mainly  is  the  case  in  Norwegian 
fisheries.  
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We analyze how cancelling the fuel tax exemptions will affect the economic performance of two 
different  vessel  groups  in  the Norwegian fishing  fleet,  and  discuss  possible  implications  for 
management and industry  from such  a policy reform.  Profitability  change from  a fuel  price 
increase is analysed by way of a sensitivity analysis. The profitability survey’s cost and earnings 
data is the basis, and by changing the fuel cost item (and the labour cost accordingly
iii) we find 
the fuel cost increase necessary for a “break even” result (EBIT=0), assuming that there are no 
effects on harvest- and stock dependent costs. Thus this is a short run bioeconomic analysis. In 
order to add “practitioners’ wisdom and experience” to the desk study, we address vessel owners 
in some vessel groups – ranging from the smallest to the largest – with telephone interviews, 
asking  them  what  consequences  different  fuel  price  increases  would  mean  to  their  fishing 
operations  and  operational  decisions.  Interviews  were  carried  out  in  December  2008,  where 
prices were back to “normal” half a year after a considerable price shock (30 per cent) on marine 
gas  oil,  and  we  avoided  questions  addressing  a  tax  increase  directly  in  order  not  to  get 
“politicized” answers.  
The two vessel groups analysed are very different: The first consists of smaller coastal vessels 
(10–15 meters) targeting demersal species, while the second is the large purse seiners which fish 
for pelagic species. The former is the most numerous group in the Norwegian fishing fleet, with 
686 vessels (40 per cent of the total number of whole-year operated vessels in 2007, and the 
latter  is  the  45  purse  seiners  with  the  additional  blue  whiting  trawl  license,  which  catch 
constituted 36 per cent of the total Norwegian catch that year. For the coastal vessels cod is the 
most  important  species,  amounting  to  39  and  56  per  cent  of  total  catch  volume  and  value, 
respectively, while for the purse seiners (vessels of 50–90 meters length) in 2007 the herring 
volume and value constituted 38 and 43 per cent, respectively, of the total catch of this vessel 
group.  Both  groups  have  that  in  common  that  they  are  very  fuel  efficient  in  their  fishing 
operation, compared to other vessel groups (Ellingsen & Lønseth, 2005; Schau et al., 2009).  
Through the lay system, the crew on the coastal vessels bears some of the increased fuel costs. 
On the other hand, the off-shore vessels can bunker tax free when fishing in distant waters. Thus, 
the fuel cost increase they incur is less than the cost increase the coastal fleet experience. Coastal 
vessels, based on 2007 data, would experience a fuel cost increase in the range of 19–24 per cent, 
while off-shore vessels would only see an increase of 15 per cent.  
The off-shore vessels’ estimated EBIT is reduced by 15 per cent, whereas the effect for the 
coastal vessels is between 5 and 12 per cent. This coarse analysis shows that, on average, the 
effect from annulling the reimbursement scheme is detrimental, but relatively modest. Annulling 
the scheme would not render the Norwegian fishing fleet unprofitable.  
Fuel is utilized to different degrees across Norwegian fishing vessels. While in some fisheries it 
constitutes only a small part of the total costs, it is substantial in others, usually gear and size 
dependent.  In  2007,  fuel  costs  constituted  on  average  24  per  cent  of  the  total  costs  (crew 
remuneration excluded) in the fleet. However, in the coastal fleet (<28m) the share was 15 per 
cent, while 28 per cent for the off-shore fleet (>28m). A more fine grained analysis reveals that 
the fuel cost share of total costs vary between 11 and 33 per cent. Another dimension is that the 
price demanded for fuel differs with the size of the vessels, and rather large rebates are conceded 
to  larger  vessels  and  high  consumption.  According  to  the  figures  from  GfF,  larger  vessels IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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(>28m) on average paid an oil price 20 per cent lower than the smallest vessels (<8m) in 2007. 
On the other hand, most of the reimbursement of mineral oil tax goes to the largest vessels. 
In 2007 roughly 4 000 vessels were reimbursed the mineral oil tax, as shown in Figure 3a; 242 
large vessels (6 per cent) received 71 per cent of the mNOK 246 reimbursement. In fact, six off-
shore vessels covered the same amount of reimbursed fuel as the 1 545 vessels below 10 meters. 
Hence, vessels less than 28 meters (94 per cent) received only 29 per cent of the sum in 2007. 
Recalling that larger vessels pay a lower fuel price and are, to some degree, able to refuel tax-
free  (abroad  or  domestically??),  the  support  from  the  reimbursement/exemption  constitute  a 
greater share of their fuel price than in the case of smaller vessels paying higher prices. Figure 3b 
reveals the development in the nominal fuel price and the mineral oil tax in 1999–2012. 
 
 a    b   
Figure 3.  Distribution of fuel tax reimbursement by vessel size (left) in 2007, and MGO price 
and tax development, 1999–2012 (right). Source: GfF, Statoil 
The fuel cost increases which would render the average vessel going break-even (EBIT=0) are 
shown in Figure 4 for twelve vessel groups; with averages for the four years 2004–2007 in order 
to smooth out annually shocks. There is a huge variation in the results. For shrimp and saithe 
trawlers, with a negative operation profit, a fuel price reduction is needed to achieve break-even. 
Trawlers – in general – are sensitive to a fuel price increase, whereas coastal vessels and purse 
seiners could endure a 200–350 per cent fuel price increase. Note that these are vessel group 
means and that individual vessels’ performance can deviate substantially. Furthermore, being a 
static analysis, implicitly it has been assumed that the vessel groups – on average – would 
generate the same revenues and costs in the same manner under a fuel price increase as was the 
case for the 2004–2007 average. This is a relatively strong assumption since vessel owners, 
under the influence or even expectations of fuel price increases, would act in order to mitigate 
such cost increases. Such adaptation strategies, both in the short and longer term, and especially 
for the two vessel groups under scrutiny, will be discussed in greater details beneath. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
  8 
 
Figure 4.  Fuel price increase “safety margin” for vessel groups with respect to fuel price 
(increase needed for “break-even” result), mean for 2004–2007. (Abbrevations: 
Pel.=pelagic, PS=purse seine, BW=blue whiting trawl license, CV=coastal vessels) 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis has demonstrated that the mineral oil tax exemptions are not a prerequisite for a 
profitable Norwegian fishing fleet. Of the population of 1700 whole year operated vessels, only 
two out of 18 vessel groups – representing about 15 vessels – had deficits for the period 2004–
2007. And the development in profitability after 2007 (according to Figure 2) should not set off 
any alarm bells in that respect either.  
In  an  almost  Parliament-wide  compromise  as  a  measure  to  promote  more  climate  friendly 
conduct,  a  proposal  was  set  forth  to  consider  phasing  out  the  fishing  industry’s  fuel  tax 
exemptions. At the present point of time (2012), however, the reimbursement scheme is still in 
effect.  
The importance of the subsidy elements of the Norwegian tax exemptions depend to a large 
extent of the perspective. The fish industry is to a large extent export oriented - thus in 
competition with fish from other countries and food sources. A survey of the fuel tax regimes in 
our neighbouring coastal states shows that none of their fleets are charged taxes on fuel (see 
Isaksen & Hermansen, 2009). Compared to this, the Norwegian regime implies no subsidies. 
Compared with other Norwegian industries the picture gets more complicated. Some industries, 
like airline, shipping and oil production, are totally exempted, as in most countries. Others, e.g. 
wood and fishmeal processing industries, pay half tax on their fuel consumption. Employing this 
perspective, there is an element of subsidies, but the amount is difficult to estimate, due to the tax 
rate differences. 
The fishing fleet can to some degree adapt to increased fuel prices. However, a political proposal 
on taxation would for sure be met with lobbyism against such measures. As underlined by one of 
the respondents when asked how an annulment would affect his adjustment: “… one possible 
response would be to drop 100 tons of herring outside the Parliament!” Even if the probability IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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of such actions may be low, one should not underestimate stakeholders’ will to retain granted 
rights. Another dimension of this is the ability of the upstream link in the seafood value chain to 
shift the burden from this tax over to the consecutive downstream links, i.e. the fish processors. 
This will depend on the competitive conditions in the market (Bendiksen 2008). In Norway, 
fishermen’s organizations have considerable market power in the first hand market for fish, 
which could vouch for a shift of the duty to adjacent stages in the value chain.  
Do fishing vessels have possibilities for substituting away from marine gas oil? In the short run 
the  way  to  adapt  to  increased  fuel  prices  is  to  alter  the  way  of  operating  the  vessel,  by 
minimizing the steaming between port and fishing ground and by reducing the speed. Vessels 
may concentrate fishing activities to periods and areas where the fish abundance is high, and 
greater  load  before  going  to  port.  Fisheries  with  marginal  profitability  might  be  rendered 
unprofitable and phased out. In the longer run, a substantial and persistent fuel price increase 
would induce increased adjustment possibilities, such as more energy efficient fishing vessels 
and gear and shift of quota rights from less to more energy inefficient gear, if allowed.  
For the smaller coastal vessels an annulment of the reimbursement scheme would be relatively 
small. Oil constitutes a relatively low cost for these vessels, and they have limited possibilities 
for substitution. Oil price increase effects in this vessel group could either be to withdraw from 
fishing for lower valued species (especially saithe, but also haddock) and from fishing from 
distant ports (i.e. spring cod fishery in Finnmark). All in all, however, the operational effect in 
this group would probably be marginal.  
For purse seiners with the additional trawl license for blue whiting, the adjustment possibilities 
are greater than for the smaller coastal vessels. The most likely adaptations would be to phase 
out fisheries with little and uncertain profitability, such as the North Sea herring with limited 
quotas, and the horse mackerel fishery. For the blue whiting fishery west of Ireland and the 
capelin fishery in the Icelandic zone fishing could either be phased out or deliveries would be 
done in Ireland/Iceland in order to reduce steaming. For other vessel groups the economic effect 
could be more substantial, especially to those at the left in Figure 4. In case of a reimbursement 
scheme annulment the landing-abroad effect would be greater and may take place in all fisheries, 
since vessels then could take an advantage of lower fuel prices abroad. Refueling at the open sea 
from foreign tanker vessels may also be an option, especially for larger fishing vessels (Isaksen 
and Hermansen, 2009). 
The rationale behind environmental taxation is to reduce emissions harming the global climate 
and  the  local  environmental  conditions.  For  some  fisheries  and  vessel  groups,  the  chosen 
adaptations may result in higher emissions in order to avoid taxed fuel, which clearly is counter-
productive.  In  addition,  in  case  of  comparatively  high  Norwegian  fuel  prices  in  the  future,  
vessels  would deliver their fish abroad,  and hence reduce the supply to  the Norwegian fish 
processing industry.  
The substantiated or potential effects from taxation constitute important information for policy 
makers. Undoubtedly this scheme is an industry support that should be abolished, especially 
since the worst emitters get the highest relief from it. However, removing this support would, 
according  to  our  analysis,  spur  incentives  and  responses  in  the  fleet  that  could  bring  about IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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unfavorable consequences, especially shift in demand towards foreign “un-taxed” fuel and a shift 
in supply of fish towards landings abroad. Some distributional effects also come into place since 
smaller energy effective vessels have considerably less opportunities to avoiding the tax.  
A good solution to protect the environment from GHG emissions from the fishing fleet calls for 
an international harmonization of fuel taxes among nations. However, in light of the efforts 
incurred  to  achieve  international  fuel  tax  agreements  for  similar  industries  (i.e.  airlines  and 
shipping) the international community does not seem ready for this yet. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i Bjorn Brochmann MSc was in 1980 on leave from the Ministry of Fisheries to the Norwegian College of Fishery 
Science when writing this article. Later, when back at the Ministry, he argued internally and externally for the 
abolishment of the fisheries subsidies. The reaction from the industry was fierce, some demanding the Minister to 
sack Director Brochmann, but without success. Gradually also the industry representatives, led by the powerful 
Federation of Fishermen, came to understand that subsidies were not sustainable. 
ii The sulphur tax is only levied on those fishing in coastal/near waters, and no reimbursement is given. Steinshamn 
(2008) point to the fact that this fleet was responsible of 5 per cent of emissions, but paid about 11 per cent of the 
total SO2-tax. However, he claims, sulphur emissions are responsible for local – not global – pollution damages, 
which makes it rational that less mobile vessels are levied this tax, and not those operating in distant waters. 
iii Labour costs in Norwegian fisheries are normally calculated as a share of revenues minus some vessel costs. In the 
coastal fleet (vessel permissions less than 28 meters) crew shares are calculated from revenues minus fuel costs, as 
opposite to the larger off-shore vessels. Coastal vessel owners can therefore “shift” some of the fuel cost increase 
over to the crew. Hence, fuel price increases’ effect on profitability is smaller in the coastal fleet than in the off-
shore fleet.  